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ARTICLE 
UNIFORMITY, DIVERSITY, AND THE 
PROCESS OF MAKING HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMS 
JOI-IN HARRISON* 
Maybe all the children cannot be above average, but every country can 
be exceptional in the sense that it can follow its own course on an issue, and 
thus be excepted from a possibly uniform rule on that issue. When variation 
is the best answer to a problem, exceptions are better than rules. With re-
spect to whether the United States should follow international human rights 
law when that differs from what otherwise would be American practice, the 
questions are whether variation is desirable and, more subtly, whether the 
best way to determine if variation is desirable is to permit nonuniformity 
without requiring it and see whether it emerges. 
The question I will address is whether the United States should adopt a 
policy of adhering to international norms on human rights in preference to 
the norms on those issues generated by this country's domestic political 
process. I will analyze it as a question of federalism-that is, as a question 
about whether government decisions are better made by central authorities 
for larger units or by decentralized decision makers for smaller units. 1 Re-
garding the process through which international human rights norms are 
* David Lurton Massee, 11'. Professor of Law and Horace W. Goldsmith Research Profes-
sor, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to the other participants on this panel for their 
comments. 
1. The question I have put, whether the United States should adopt a policy of adhering to 
international human rights norms, includes two important assumptions. One is that this choice, 
under current political arrangements, is one for the decision makers of the United States, not 
international decision makers. The United States will decide whether to follow international norms 
instead of domestic norms; the General Assembly of the United Nations will not decide whether 
the United States will follow its domestic norms rather than international norms. Less obvious, but 
also important, is the assumption that this is a question that, because it will be decided one country 
at a time, can be decided differently from country to country. A decision by the United States not 
to adhere to international norms in general does not preclude a decision by Turkey to do so. 
Supranational governmental bodies like the European Union do not have to be, or aspire to be, 
universal, any more than a fully-fledged state with a federal strncture needs to be universal. This 
second assumption is important because several of my arguments about the merits and demerits of 
supranational decision making as opposed to domestic decision making apply specifically to this 
334 
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formulated as a government is, of course, an abstraction from the real 
world, but that process produces rules that may be legally binding and 
hence, in a central sense, it is a legislative process. It is thus a fair approxi-
mation to think of the choice as a choice among legislatures that operate at 
different levels.2 
I will argue that for the United States, decentralization with respect to 
human rights law is better than centralization. This country should not 
adopt a general principle of adhering to international human rights norms 
when those norms differ from corresponding American law. 
People, whether considered individually or in groups, are alike in some 
ways and different in others. All individuals are alike in needing to eat and 
drink, and all political units are alike in needing to make arrangements that 
will facilitate their members' satisfaction of those needs. Individuals differ 
in many ways, such as in their responses fo many medications. Political 
units likewise differ, sometimes for reasons related to the idiosyncrasies of 
the individuals they comprise, sometimes for reasons related to their own 
features such as geography. The best public-health rules for a densely popu-
lated city in a hot climate may well be different from the best public-health 
rules for a cold and rural place. The possibility of variation provides the 
basic argument for decentralized decision making. 3 When a government 
legislates for more people and more territory, it must consider more possi-
ble variation in its laws, because there are more grounds for variation. A 
government that extends only over a limited zone of climate, for example, 
must consider fewer possible climate-related variations in its public-health 
laws than must a government that rules both temperate and tropical territo-
ries. When government decision makers must consider the possibility of 
variation, they must make two choices: whether the rule should vary, and in 
every place in which a separate rule is required, what the rule should be. 
A federal system can reduce the amount of information that must be 
acquired and understood by government decision makers by allocating au-
thority to lower levels that rule fewer people and extend over a smaller area. 
It can make the choice between diversity and uniformity indirectly, without 
anyone having to address the issue. If the lower-level decision makers are 
functioning reasonably well and the ideal solution is one of uniformity, they 
will all reach the same result and produce uniformity even though no one 
country, not necessarily to any other. As one who welcomes nonuniformity in general, I find this 
reassuring rather than troubling. 
2. American federalism itself divides responsibility for the fonnation and enforcement of 
human rights norms between levels, and assigns some of the most basic and important issues of all 
to the states. I will generally neglect internal American federalism in this discussion, other than to 
draw on it heavily for an understanding of federalism in general. 
3. A classic statement of this pdnciple specifically with respect to the provision of public 
goods is Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (rev. ed., Ashgate Publg. 1993). Oates explains the 
diversity of preferences leads naturally to decentralization as a means of satisfying the preferences 
of as many people as possible. [d. at 11. 
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made that choice as such. If the ideal result is diversity, the varying answers 
provided by the lower-level decision makers will vary.4 
Of course, there are standard reasons in federalisms to assign the deci-
sion to the center and not the subordinate units. Those reasons fall into two 
broad categories. One involves interactions and interdependencies among 
the subordinate units.s It may be, for example, that they face collective-
action issues involving coordination or externalities. The classic instance of 
a coordination problem has clear applicability here: it is much more impor-
tant that all fifty American states have the same-handedness rule of the road 
than that they have their own well-tailored rule. As for externalities, they 
range from economies of scale in the production of collective goods such as 
defense to cross-border pollution. In many such instances, bargaining 
among the smaller units is likely to be less effective than the creation of a 
unitary decision maker. 
The other broad category consists of situations in which there is some 
reason to believe that the decision-making processes at the center are better 
than those in the subordinate units, more capable of making rational choices 
by whatever standard normatively. applies. For example, a proponent of 
democratic decision making might favor the center in a country in which 
the central legislature was apportioned by population while the subsidiary 
legislatures were severely malapportioned.6 One of the foundational texts of 
American political science, Federalist 10, argues from pure scale. Accord-
ing to Madison, under the conditions of 1788, democratic assemblies 
elected from larger polities are likely to be more just than democratic as-
semblies elected from smaller polities. Larger districts will tend toward the 
election of better people, and a multiplicity of interests in the legislature 
will inhibit the formation of exploitive majority coalitions.? Whether that 
was ever true and whether it is true now anywhere are hard questions. 
As a general matter, then, decentralized decision making has important 
advantages, but there are identifiable situations in which centralization is 
nevertheless useful. I turn now to the application of these principles to the 
law concerning basic human rights and the choice between national and 
supranational law making. 
Although it may seem obvious that variation is not appropriate with 
respect to basic human rights-which are called basic in part because they 
4. The costs of decision making also make it impossible in practice to have a petfect match 
between the scope of a problem and the level of government that deals with it, because there can 
be only so many levels of government. Id. at 48-49. 
5. As Oates explains, the natural case for decentralization is undermined by intetjurisdic-
tional externalities. Id. at 46. 
6. In one large democracy the opposite is the case, with current constitutional rules requir-
ing equipopulous legislative districts in the subsidiary units, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964), while one house of the national legislature is grossly malapportioned, U.S. Const. alt. I, 
§ 3, d. 1 (Senate composed of two Senators from each state). 
7. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (Gary Willis ed., 1982). 
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are the minimum to which everyone is entitled-in fact it may be. The 
abstract point may best be approached through a concrete example. Con-
sider one striking way in which American law departs from the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a departure sufficiently clear 
and important to be covered by one of this country's reservations in its 
ratification of the treaty. Article 20 of the Covenant provides that any prop-
aganda for war shall be prohibited by law.8 I think it clear that a federal or 
state statute providing "propaganda for war is hereby prohibited" would be 
unconstitutional on its face under current doctrine.9 
For an American it may seem obvious that Article 20 was drafted by 
people who do not value liberty or do not believe in the marketplace of 
ideas, or both. But then to a non-American it may seem obvious that propa-
ganda for war has borne bitter fruit over millennia, and that only a country 
as relatively lucky as the United States can get away with permitting it. And 
maybe both are right, and more to the point maybe the best rule about per-
mitting or prohibiting propaganda for war varies in space. In some places 
the threat from warmongering may be especially great because ruinous war 
is often on the horizon. Or the costs of forbidding that kind of speech may 
be low because it does not figure prominently in the thought and rhetoric of 
the people. But the benefits of permitting pro-war advocacy may also be 
great. A country in which people revere advocates of martial virtue such as 
Theodore Roosevelt, or the Spartan mothers who told their sons to come 
back with their shields or on them, may find much to cherish in speeches in 
favor of taking up arms.lO That country or another may find the cost of 
warmongering low, perhaps because the likelihood of war or ruinous war is 
low. 
It is thus certainly possible that variation is the best outcome on this 
important question concerning free expression. If we think of the interna-
tional legal system as a federalism, with the individual states as the 
subordinate units and the mechanism for formulating international norms as 
the center, we can ask the standard questions posed by federalism theory 
with respect to international human rights norms. Do the standard justifica-
8. Off. U.N. High Commr. Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 20(1), http://www.ohchr.org/engJish/law/ccpr.htm#art20 (accessed Apr. 15,2006). The 
United States Senate, in its resolution giving consent to U.S. ratification of the Covenant, included 
a reservation providing that Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by 
the United States that would restrict the right of free speech ~nd association protected by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. 138 Congo Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
9. See e.g. U.S. V. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning may not be banned as such). 
10. Indeed, a foundational document of this country refers to the necessity of taking up arms, 
and is certainly propaganda for one particular war, that of the American Revolution. On July 6, 
1775, the Continental Congress adopted a Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up 
Anns. ContI. Cong., Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, in Documents 
Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States 10-17 (Charles C. Tansil! ed., 
Govt. Prtg. Off. 1927). 
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tions for central decision making argue in favor of an international answer 
with respect to human rights like free expression? 
As a general matter they do not. One perhaps surprising feature of 
basic human rights is that the benefits of having them and the costs of vio-
lating them are overwhelmingly local and do not give rise to interdepen-
dence. To begin with, human rights rules rarely if ever exhibit the kind of 
network effects that give rise to coordination problems. People must speak 
the same language in order to communicate and everyone at a circular din-
ner table must use either the bread plate on the right or the bread plate on 
the left, but variations as to human rights do not interfere with one another. 
A country that puts a high premium on personal honor, and so protects 
reputation and privacy vigorously, does not need to coordinate with a coun-
try that values expression highly and so allows its citizens to deal freely 
with one another's fame and personal information. I I 
Moreover, pure coordination problems can be solved with nothing 
more than communication, because it is individually rational for all parties 
who need to coordinate to follow the same rule; all they need is information 
about the rule and about one another's information about the rule. If any 
issues involving human rights should fall into this category, the United 
States and all other countries will find it in their interest to adopt the same 
norm and there will be no conflict between otherwise-applicable American 
views and those in the relevant international norm. In those situations, if 
there are any, it thus will not be necessary for the United States to adopt a 
policy of departing from what it otherwise would do in order to comport 
with international rules. 
Coordination is only one reason for different jurisdictions, or different 
individuals, to adopt the same rule, or, more generally, to follow a rule 
adopted by a process that applies to all the jurisdictions or individuals. 
Other interaction effects that can give rise to problems among uncoordi-
nated jurisdictions or individuals involve negative externalities, especially 
those arising from adverse material spillovers such as transborder pollution. 
Although such problems can sometimes be solved by bargaining, some-
times bargaining is inadequate and the best solution involves the creation of 
a common authority that can actually dictate a rule, rather than just enforc-
ing a rule adopted by the parties. 
Once again it is difficult to see how human rights law would often 
present such a situation. The material effects of respect for or violation of 
basic rights are heavily localized, because the effects are overwhelmingly 
borne by the individuals directly concerned. The primary victim of torture 
is the victim of torture. Perhaps the most important exception involves refu-
11. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public figures may recover for defamation 
only by proving actual malice), commits the United States to a weighting that favors public debate 
at the cost of the reputations of those who have entered the public fray. 
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gees, who move across borders in response to human rights violations and 
so impose material costs on countries other than those that violate their 
rights. Whatever the importance of that possibility in the abstract, it is 
largely irrelevant to the United States, an immensely powerful magnet for 
immigration and not a place from which many people flee. 
In any event, there is a serious mismatch between international human 
rights norms and the problem of interjurisdictional spillovers. That problem 
arises primarily not from variation but from lack of enforcement, and in the 
spillover context central authority primarily contributes enforcement, not 
norm formulation. For example, a landmark case in the development of 
international institutions for dealing with material inteljurisdictional spil-
lovers in the form of pollution, the Trail Smelter Case,12 was about enforce-
ment much more than about substance. The Canadian-United States arbitral 
tribunal deciding that case confronted air pollution from a smelter in British 
Columbia that spread to the United States. In formulating the applicable 
norms of international law, the tribunal drew freely on the domestic antipol-
lution and nuisance law of one of the parties, the United States, and in 
particular on Supreme Court opinions dealing with interstate pollution. 13 An 
international body was needed, not to decide what the legal rules should be, 
but to create a forum in which they could be applied to sovereign states. 
International human rights law, however, consists of a body of norms, 
not an enforcement system. When the United States took a reservation to 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it was engaged in a dispute 
about the appropriate content of the law, and the question whether to follow 
the Covenant or the First Amendment is a question about what rule to have, 
not about how to enforce it. There is good reason to believe that interna-
tional human rights treaties encounter grave enforcement problems where 
they are most needed. 14 The issue of adhering to agreements like the Cove-
nant is quite distinct from the question whether the United States should be 
party to an effective system of international adjudication concerning human 
rights, a system that would not have to have its own distinctive law. Such 
an enforcement system could simply require that states adhere to the human 
rights principles they ostensibly embrace, following the lead of the Trail 
Smelter tribunal by using states' own norms to decide interstate disputes. 
Were such a system in place, some states might then admit that their official 
position is not to recognize human rights. Were that to happen, it might be 
12. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, in Reports of International Arbitral Awards 
vol. 3, 1911 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1997) (reported Apr. 16, 1938). 
13. Id. at 1964--65. 
14. Oona Hathaway conducted a substantial statistical study of state practice in ratifying and 
complying with human rights treaties. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference? 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). She discovered that "treaty ratification is not infrequently 
associated with worse human rights ratings than otherwise expected" and hypothesized that for 
countries with bad human rights records treaty ratitlcation was a way to look good without per-
forming. Id. at 1940-41. 
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useful to formulate truly minimal norms at an international level. Such hy-
pothetical possibilities, however, have little to do with a debate about 
whether the international lawmaking process is a good way for resolving 
contested questions about human rights such as the propriety of banning 
propaganda for war. No such system of international enforcement is on the 
horizon. 
Besides producing material externalities, jurisdictions may find them-
selves in collective-action traps in which they pursue policies that are col-
lectively irrational because they lead to a race to the bottom. Identifying 
such situations is often a matter of controversy because one observer's bot-
tom is another's top; inteljurisdictional competition with respect to much 
regulation provides classic examples, as friends of regulation think the com-
petition destructive while critics of regulation think it leads to better legal 
systems. IS 
It is a tricky question whether there is a substantial amount of destruc-
tive competition with respect to basic human rights rules. To say that there 
is implies that to a significant extent governments that otherwise would 
adhere to desirable policies with respect to human rights fail to do so in 
order to attract capital (or conceivably immigration, though for obvious rea-
sons that seems especially unlikely). Although it is possible to imagine re-
gimes that are prepared to be ruthless with respect to their own people but 
that would prefer not to be (were not being ruthless less costly in terms of 
rents that could be extracted from foreign investment), it is also easy to 
believe that such regimes are rare or nonexistent. Governments that are pre-
pared to subject their people to violations of basic rights have all sorts of 
temptations to do so that involve purely domestic exploitation. 16 
Once again, the relevance of this question to the policy of the United 
States is quite limited. Cartels matter among actual or potential competitors, 
and it is hard to imagine that this country is attracting foreign capital by 
cutting corners on basic rights, and in particular that its refusals to adhere to 
international human rights norms reflect an American decision to compete 
for capital by offering a business-friendly but rights-unfriendly environ-
ment. This country does not permit propaganda for war in order to attract 
investment by arms manufacturers, and the former policy of the United 
States with respect to the age at which people could be held accountable for 
crimes through the death penalty-an especially controversial manifestation 
15. A leading treatment of this issue in the environmental regulation context is Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992). 
16. My skepticism on this point does not imply that governments are never influenced by an 
interest in attracting foreign capital. They very likely are, and it is entirely possible that such 
competition, which mayor may not be desirable, affects policy decisions, such as policy with 
respect to labor unions. Variation among more or less decent governments with respect to debata-
ble policy choices is quite distinct from the reaction of governments that are prepared seriously to 
exploit their subjects in order to spur investment. 
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of American exceptionalism-was not driven by an interest in bringing in 
capital investment. Other countries may wish they did not have to compete 
with the United States for investment, but any competitive disadvantage 
they may suffer would not be cured by American accession to more interna-
tional human rights normsP 
As I indicated at the outset, the other main argument for making a 
decision at the center or a higher level is that the process used at the center 
or higher level is somehow superior to that used at the more local level. In 
some countries, many people no doubt would assent to unfavorable compar-
isons of their own political processes, and one important justification for the 
international elaboration of basic rules may be that it provides people in 
those countries who are trying to change their own system with some ge-
neric principles that do not have potentially embarrassing associations with 
any other country in particular. Once again, though, American exceptional-
ism, albeit in a quite weak form, is relevant here. For Americans the ques-
tion is not whether the process that produces international human rights 
norms is superior to the similar process inside some or most countries, but 
whether it is superior to the process in this one. And it is important to bear 
in mind that the question is whether one process is superior to another. The 
fact that one regards the content of international human rights norms as 
superior to corresponding American norms is evidence of procedural supe-
riority, but no more than that. 
Having mentioned the venerable Federalist 10, I should quickly put it 
aside. If Madison's argument was ever correct, it has no relevance in this 
context. He proposed two mechanisms that would make a federal Congress 
more just than a state legislature. One was having larger districts from 
which members would be elected, which would make it more likely that 
individuals of good character would be elected. 18 The other was the inter-
ference that would be produced by multiple factions, or as we would say, 
interest groups.19 
The first mechanism rests on pure scale, not relative size, and is long 
since obsolete even within this country. When Madison wrote, the popula-
tion of the United States was about 4,000,000,20 Today the smallest constit-
uency represented in Congress, the state of Wyoming, has about 500,000 
17. It can be argued that the United States could contribute to needed cartelization through 
the symbolism of joining in uniform human rights principles, rather than pursuing its own course. 
It is quite difficult to assess the likely practical impact of such symbolic moves. 
18. Madison argued that large rather than small electoral districts were more likely to "refine 
and enlarge the public views," producing legislatures whose output would be more consonant with 
the public views than would be the unmediated decisions of the people themselves. The Federal-
ist No. 10, supra n. 7, at 46-47. 
19. [d. at 47-48. 
20. U.S. Dept. Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Colonial Times to 1970, 8, http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl-02.pdf 
(Sept. 1975) (estimating U.S. population in 1790 at 3,929,000). 
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people?1 As a substantial fraction of 4,000,000, 500,000 easily would sat-
isfy Madison's criterion for a large district.22 Indeed, today California has 
about 35,484,000 people.23 The California Senate has forty members, while 
the California Assembly has eighty.24 The smallest statewide constituency 
in California thus has more than 400,000 people. By Madison's standards, 
the Golden State alone should abound in virtuous characters who could be 
selected for public service through a process of refinement. The United 
States has already achieved the benefits of scale in which Madison be-
lieved, many times over. There is no more need for extension of the sphere 
of government. 25 
Madison's second mechanism involves interference among interest 
groups. The more interests represented in a legislature, he believed, the 
harder it would be for a majority faction to form.26 Once again, the United 
States itself already has achieved whatever is to be achieved through this 
mechanism. The interests represented in and through the federal govern-
ment are mind boggling in their number and range, a number and range that 
vastly exceed those contained in the small, agricultural country of which 
Madison wrote. If large republics reap the benefits described in Federalist 
10, this country is more than large enough. 
Differences other than scale and scope can distinguish public decision-
making processes. Someone who believes in democratic decision making 
will prefer a more democratic process, and if the more democratic process 
operates at a higher or more central level of government, that level will be 
preferred for that reason and to that extent. 
21. Wyoming's population in 2003 was approximately 501,000. U.S. Dept. Commerce, Bu-
reau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 20, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/ 
statistical-abstract-200L2005.html; select 1-69 under 2004-2005 column (last updated Jan. 4, 
2006). Wyoming was the least populous state. [d. at 21. Its two Senators thus represent the small-
est constituency in the upper chamber of Congress. Rhode Island, the least populous of the states 
that have two Representatives in the House of Representatives, had approximately 1,076,000 peo-
ple in 2003. [d. at 20. Each of Rhode Island's two congressional districts thus should be more 
populous than Wyoming, making Wyoming's single Representative the member of the House 
with the smallest constituency. 
22. Moreover, the figure of 4,000,000 overstates the population of the United States in 1790 
for these purposes, because the disenfranchisement of women and slaves made most of the adult 
population in effect unavailable for public service. 
23. [d. at 20. 
24. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 2. 
25. Madison did not say anything about the shape of the relationship between constituency 
size and virtue in the legislature, but it is hard to imagine that, if such an effect exists and operates 
in the direction Madison supposed, it is linear. If it were, the Congress of today would have, very 
roughly speaking, at least seventy times the public virtue of the first Congress. This seems un-
likely. Rather, if Madison was correct at all, the effect must level off quite quickly. 
26. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests 
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a 
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of interests composing 
the ml\iority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily 
will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. 
The Federalist No. 10, supra n. 7, at 48. 
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Whether the process by which international human rights law is for-
mulated is superior to the process by which American domestic human 
rights law is formulated is, of course, a question that can be answered only 
on the basis of some quite controversial normative assumptions. Moreover, 
a convincing answer to that question would require a circumstantial knowl-
edge of that process that is much more detailed than mine. I can, however, 
state the two main grounds that cause me to expect that no systematic im-
provement in the quality of norms would result from moving these deci-
sions from the American domestic to the international level. 
First, if one believes as I do that representative democracy is the best 
way of resolving controversial questions on issues as to which individual 
choice is not a possible resolution-perhaps best only in being the worst 
except for all the others, but still best-then the process of international 
human rights norm formulation is not an improvement over the internal 
politics of this country. Treaties are negotiated by governments, and multi-
lateral treaties that aspire to worldwide scope are negotiated by many, many 
governments. And many, many governments are themselves highly un-
democratic.27 Their participation in the formulation of norms thus makes 
that process less, not more, democratic. And the other major source of inter-
national law, state practice, reflects the conduct of those same states, so 
many of which are not democracies. 
Next, the most plausible response to the foregoing objection also does 
not persuade me. The response is that the international process is superior to 
that of the United States because it incorporates the insights of many differ-
ent cultures and traditions, and that the democratic credentials of the states 
involved is irrelevant on this score. Once again, the sheer size of the United 
States all by itself is a crucial consideration. This is a large country with 
free and extensive political debate. As such, it can make political decisions 
on the basis of a wide variety of views. It is true that the United States is 
also a liberal democracy, so there is very likely a strong bias in its public 
debate in favor of liberalism and democracy. That in turn suggests that the 
main marginal contribution to thought about basic human rights that would 
come from extending the range of debate to include other countries would 
be of views that are illiberal and undemocratic. 
I would be very slow to conclude, and I think most Americans would 
be very slow to conclude, that the weakness in this country's political pro-
27. Every year Freedom House conducts a survey of freedom in the world that classifies 
countries as free, partly free, and not free. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005, http:// 
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005 (2005). For 2005, 192 countries were 
rated of which just under half, 89, were rated as free. [d. at http://www.freedoml1ouse.org/tem-
plate.cfm?page=130&year=2005. Unfree countries included the world's most populous, China, 
which had the same freedom rating as Belarus and Somalia. [d. at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
template.cfm?page=25&year=2005; select Combined Average Ratings 2005. There were 119 
electoral democracies, not all of which were rated as free countries. [d.; select Table of Electoral 
Democracies. 
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cess is that no one listens to those who deny that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that govern-
ments me instituted to secure these rights, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed. If accepting international human rights norms 
means diluting those principles, most of us will ask to be excepted. 
